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MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Fundamental Scheme of Front Offensivey Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov
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Followingerbatim translation of an article titled* "The Fundamental Schemeront Offensivey Lieutenant- General V. Baskakov.
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This article appeared inl Third Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya My si (Military Thought). This Journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SKCRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Araiy Commander.
The Fundamental Schemeront Offensive Operation
by
Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov
The concept of the "fundamental scheme of an operation" is not familiar to our readers, so we shall define at once what we mean by it.
All operations of one war are waged by almost one and the same means of armed combat, and most often the organizational forms of troops in all operations likewise remain unchanged. Thus, within the extreme diversity of the specific features of the front offensive operations of the Second World War, one can discern specific traits characteristic of almost all of them. This was also noted in the operations of ths First World War.
The substance of these general traits characteristic of all operationsiven war and taker, in total we propose to call the fundamental scheme ol an operation. By summarizing the basic characteristics of operationsingle scheme, it is easy to understand not only the substance and meaning of each of these characteristics, but also the mutual relationship and meaningem in the operationhole. Such an examina-
tion of the basic characteristics of an operation of the last war is very convenient and makes it easier to establish graphically their suitability or unsuitability under modern conditions and to determine the fundamental scheme of an operationuture war.
The fundamental scheme, put forth by us. ofront in the period ofcond World Warisopy of any operation that took place. the great number of operations, there is none whosefundamental characteristics would not be reflected on
We shall make clear why the fundamental schemeront offensive operation in the last war was the way it was.
The basic features of an operation are determined first of all by what typ: of armed forces, what arm cf troops is the main one and what constitutes the basis of their combat strength. As is known in the last war the chief means for conducting military operations and the basic combat strength of the armed forces ware ground troops, consisting of combined arms armies (which in turnof rifle divisions) and partly of large units of armored troops (tank and mechanized corps organized by brigades).
Besides this, the level of development of industrial production, science, and of technology in many countries was, by the beginning of the Second World War, already high enough toariety of military equipment and arms. This alsothe belligerents to bring their operational art out from the stagnant position in which it found itself at the end of the First World War. At the same time, it was still impossible to bring about complete motorization of all groundesult of which the basic combat complement of armies and fronts remained
the rifle divisions. The quantitativend th" qualitative
development of artillery, aviation, and other means ofthe raising of their destructive capabilities, striking
power and range of operation still could not essentially alter their
roles as combat and operationspons.
The aviation, artillery, chemical, engineer, airborne and other arms of troops with all ofcombat equipment only assisted in accomplishing majornd operational tasks, but independently they could not completely accomplish them.
By virtue of this, the outcome of combat- operation depended mainly on the success of ihe operationsthe infantry divisions, which constituted not only the basis but also themajority of the forces of ground troops. The destruction of the most important groupings of the enemy's ground troops was
the mainhe basic content cf operations and of combat operations in general. In this, all attention was concentrated on routing the enemy in the tactical and immediate operational depth, where the significant part of his infantry divisions was located.
This was reflected in esser.ce in the whole character of the last war and in the methods and forms of conducting combatincluding the fundamental scheme for mounting an offensive operationront.
The depthront operation was determined by theof the ground troops, the means for reinforcement, the control points, the rear installations and the basic forces of the tacticalof the group of enemy armies, andilometers.
An offensive began,ule,reakthrough of the solid front of the enemy's combat formations on the mostaxes and swiftly developed to the immediate operational depth, frequently leading to the encirclement of enemy troops. ethod of conducting an operation was the only one possible,because the weapons of neutralisation in that period, with all allowance for their concentration, could not by themselves destroy the enemy's divisions of ground troops and the means for their reinforcement. Our analogous divisions could rout, destroy, or capture theof the enemy divisions only when they had the necessaryin forces and with advantageous operational preconditions.
Under these conditions,an important role in takingront operation was played by the choice of thethe main and auxiliary strikes, the concentration on thosethe necessary forces, and the establishment over the enemysuperiority which guaranteed the success of combattheory of the main strike was fundamental in theof the period of the Second World War. Therefore, thealso occupies the most important place oa Diagram 1,
The exploitationreakthrough was accomplished bytank and mechanized troops into the battle, which assured high speeds for the offensive. The study of the operational exploitationreakthroughobile arm of troops, of the deployment of this arm of troops, and of the bases of the organization andof its large units was also the most important in the operational art and in the military science of that periodhbla.
In the fundamental schemeront offensive operation of the last war there was shown the use of large units of armored troops for purposes of operational exploitationreakthrough and completion of the encirclement of the basic grouping of the enemy's troops.
Obviously, there is no need to prove that the fundamental schemeront offensive operation of the last war can no longer express the content of an operationodern nuclear/missile war.
Consequently, the problem consists of discovering in what-measure the new fundamental scheme of an operationodern war differs from the former scheme, which elements from the old scheme retain their significance, which will disappear completely, and which will be transformed under the new conditions.
The degree of these differences is determined by the changes which occurred in the postwar period and which can occur in the future, primarily in the development of the productive forces and the political conditions of lifeociety. The significantof the productive forcesociety and of the weapons of armed combat cannot fail toubstantial change in the forms and methods of conducting combat operations in modern warfare and. certainly, introduces specific corrections into the fundamental schemeront operation.
The basic means of armed combat and of the basic combat strength of the belligerents, as we have already examinedill not be divisions of ground troops and not ground troopshole, no matter how they might be supplied with the weapons neces sary forobile war, bu'. nuclear/missile weapons and the troops which assure their use, the destruction of which is the main goal of the military operations of the belligerents.
In connection with this, the number of divisions inront will decrease significantly, and additional large units and units which ensure the use of nuclear/missile weapons will be included. However, this does notelittling orof the important role of ground troops in routing of the enemy. The role of ground and airborne troops will be determined by the need to complete the rout of an enemy who has been subjected to nuclear strikes, to take and consolidate an area, to establish the forward edge of contact with the enemy's troops, and to protect and defend the operational rear area.
The content of the fundamental schemeront offensive operation in modern warfare must also specify all of this.
Considering the nature Of nuclear/missile warfare, one can raise the question: ront offensive operation take place at all? Will the war not end with the conduct of the initial massive nuclear/missile strike in conjunction with the utilization ofand bacteriological weapons? Indeed, at the moment there exist bases for raising such questions. Il is enough to cite, for example, the possibility of the complete annihilation of whole countries by nuclear weapons in short periods of time. Despite this, however, we consider that the operationpecific form
Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryirs; Issue.
of armed combat is alsoodern warfare. It istouture war only to an initial strategic nuclear strike.trike, unquestionably,efinitetage, of such an operation. After these strikes an attempt must bc made tosimultaneously anderies of operations in various theaters of military operations and operational axes. The basic content oi these operations will be the conduct of powerful nuclear/missile strikes and vigorous actions by ground andtroops, the Air Force, and the Navy.
The main purposeodern operation, as is known, is the destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons. The front, which operates in specific demarcated lines and under theexisting in one theater, cannot carry on combat against, for example, intercontinental missile bases located on differentbecause it does not have the necessary intelligence organs and weapons of destruction. It is clear that it is necessary to call n the weapons of the Ceneral Headquarters of the Supreme High- ommand for combat against them.
In connection with this, the place of the front operation in modern warfare will be determined, in our view, by which enemy nuclear weapons the front must destroy, under the given conditions. It is known that the nuclear/missile weapons of the USA arein groups: the weapons of operational-tactical designation for ground troops, with limited tactical-technical potentialities, the majority of which are located close to the line of contact of theart notfarthero ISO kilometers; medium rangeohich are distributedepthooOOkmirom the line of contact oi the belligerents; and finally intercontinental missilesange ofilometers or more.
The front's composition will be changed, depending on which group (groups) of nuclear/missile weapons it mu"st destroy. Thus, if the missionront is to destroy and annihilate the operational-tactical nuclear/missile weapons and the first echelon of ground
troops, then its composition can be close to that currently accepted and the depth of such an operation will not change substantially in comparison with the experience of the last war. In this case, the destruction of the operational and strategic nuclear/missile weapons and the following echelons of ground troops, located beyond the limits of the depth of the front operation, must be accomplished with weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command or it will be necessary to organiseroup of fronts or aand staff for the theater' of military operations with thecombat weapons to perform these missions.
In our view, the most acceptable version of the missionront is the liquidation of all nuclear/missile weapons designated by the enemy for combativen axis and distributed within the boundariesiven continent. In this case, the meaningront as the basic level of command in the organization of armed combat is preserved and removes the necessity of establishing intervening levelsroup of frontsommand for the theater of military operations is eliminated). The General Headquarter* Is thus freed from carrying out the missions which the frontare able to perform. Besides thts. destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons requires the immediate deployment of the operations of ground and airborne landing troops throughout the depth of the given axis. This will be more difficult for the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to carry out than for the front, which has these troops at its disposal and is able to organize their coordinated operations. In this case, the nuclear/ missile weapons located outside the boundaries of the offensive tone and of the missions of the fronts and chiefly on other continents and on the ocean will be destroyed by weapons of the GeneralHeadquarters of the Supreme High Command.
In connection with this, the depthront operation must be sharply increased, and this will be its new identifying It should be noted that the calculated depthront operation since the last war has grown repeatedly. In the postwar
years itilometers, with the appearance of nuclear/ missile weapons itilometers, and at the present time itilometers and more.
It seems to us that the depthront operation, as well as the width of its offensive zone, must be defined on the basis of the role of the front in routing the enemy. Taking the above statements into account, we consider that the depthodern front opera-tion must reachoOO.kilpracters. All enemy nuclear/ missile weapon's designated for combativen axis will be distributed within the boundaries of this area. The width of the front zone wilt also growilometers and more.
Thus, the front operation of the future must become an actual deep operation which meets the modern requirements for the simultaneous destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons throughout the depthiven theater of military operations.
In the operations of past wars, simultaneous fire effect against the entire depth of the enemy's defense could not be realized because of the lack of sufficiently powerful and long-range weapons of neutralization {with the exception, of course, of aviation) and in practice did notecisive influence on the outcome of an operation. Nuclear/missile weapons permit accomplishment of the simultaneous neutralization of the enemyepth of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, and the full motorization and mechanization of the armies and the mass use of airborne troops ensures the swift transfer of operations to the operational depth where the enemy's basic weapons of nuclear attack will be located. In connection with this, modern frontwill be distinguished mainly by the delivery of massive nuclear/ missile strikes on the enemy's nuclear weapons and other important objectives and by the quick exploitation of the results of these strikes by ground and airborne landing troops.
An essential modification will occur, in particular, in the operations of the ground troops. Full motorization and mechanization
of ground troops, it would seem, facilitates swift operations for the purpose of the most rapid penetration into the enemy's operational depth, of exploiting the results of the nuclear/missile strikes delivered against him, and of completing his rout. However, the possible speed of advance of large units of ground troops and the rate of the0 kilometers and morehour period) still will not guarantee the immediate gaining of nuclear and other targets of operational significance or their destruction.
Even the maximum speedsodern operation allow an enemy to reorganizeertain degree, to transfer thenuclear weapons to other regions, to bring up new forces from the zone of interior, and to organize resistance to the attacking troops. Therefore, we must look for something else, namely, for the operations of troops with significantly greater speed than that which ground troops have.
During the Civil War and the Second World War theand skillful use of the mobile arm of troops as an independent operational category yielded great advantage, and there are no grounds to consider that in modern warfare this principle will not be accepted.
The conduct of deep operations and the transfer of vigorous operationsignificant operational depth of the enemy'sin short periods of time will be more essential now than in past wars. Therefore, the significance of therm of troops not only does not decrease,bu: even incvoa. cs,
The mobility of troops must be such that they can get to regions where the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons are located literallyew hours after the delivery of our nuclear strikes and before the enemy succeeds in re-establishing his own combat effectiveness and in eliminating consequences of these strikes.
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This can be achieved only by airborne landing troops, as well as motorized rifle units and large units, transferred to the
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enemy's operational depth by air transport. However, one must speak not ot the dropping or landing of separate operational airborne landing forces into the enemy's deep rear area, but of the massive use in the operation of airborne and motorized rifle troopsobile arm of the troops.
Reviewing the fundamental scheme of an operation in modern warfarehould like to draw the reader's attention to the question of the principle of the main strike and its roleodern operation. We examined this problem in detail in an article published in the first issue of the Special Collection Under modern conditions, to attach the operations of the basic forces of the front and primarily of nuclear/missile weaponspecific axis,ery important one for the operations of ground troops in the front zone, is completely incorrect. The concentration of forces and weaponspecific axis in an operation can no longerefinite operational principle and must be replaced by the principle of concentration of the basic effortsront on the -destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons and the basic groupings of his ground troops. In this, the ground troopsront will function not as large groupings and notolid front, but on several axes as separate large units and even as units, while carryingroad maneuver during the operation.
As anhould like to note the decision taken by the commander of the southern side in an operational exercise One of the most important characteristics of thisin our view, is that in it several new means of conducting an operation under conditions of the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons were shown. The need to create cumbersome groupings of ground troops whichood target for the enemy's nuclear attacks is precluded by the solution in the operation.
Such will be, in our opinion, the basic characteristics of an offensive operationrontuture war'which also must determine the outlines of the fundamental scheme of this operation.
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The diagram presented reflects these characteristics and can be looked upon as typicalront offensive operation.
This diagram shows that the primary weapon for routing the enemy in an operation is nuclear/missile weapons and not ground troops and that divisions of ground troops and airborne troops are used only for purposes of completing theestruction.
The operation beginsowerful nuclear strike on the nuclear/missile weapons and the basic groupings of ground and airborne troops, the aviation and the navy of the enemy. with this strike or immediately thereafter the troops of the first operational echelonshift to the offensive, and an airborne landing operation is carried out. Graphically the destruction of nuclear weapons and the defeat of the enemy's troops by the nuclear weaponsront are indicated on the diagram by areas of complete neutralization and by zones with high levels of radiation.
The basic groups of missile troops and the fundamental apportionment of missions among them are reflected on the The aisc of medium range missilesiring range of up toilometers, which are designated forue tiorToft he trSops of a'group of the enemy's armies andis5iU weapons wilhin ihc limits o:ange, must be closely coordinated with the operations of the first operational echelon "of the ground troops and airborne troops which have been thrown into the immediate operalional depth. The use of long range missilesiring range ofoilometers must be coordinated'with "the execution of basic airborne land-iSSJlRSF^tionj.inthe operational depth of disposition of the enemy's troops. It'is possible that the number of classes and groups of nuclear/missile weapons can also be different if this depends on considerations of an economic or technical nature. From an operational viewpoint, however, it isto have missiles of the indicated classes as the weaponsront.
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The most important principleeep operation is expressed on the diagram as the simultaneous neutralisation by nuclear weapon of all of the most important targets and primarily of the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, his ground and airborne troops, and his aviation in the entire depth of their possible disposition to the borders of the continent, in conjunction with the offensive of the first echelon of ground troops and with the operations of powerful airborne forces in the deep operational rear area of the enemy.
The ground troops have been represented as two echelons. The first operational echelon consists of two armies consisting in all_ofoivisions and designated for completion of the rout of the troops of the cnemy'j group of armies. The secondechelon consists of one armyivisions, whose mission is not to develop success in the operation, as was done formerly, but defense of the operational rear area of the front and combat with the operational airborne landing forces of the enemy during the whole operation. The large units of the second echelon of the front can be utilized in case of the need to augment the efforts of the attacking armies of the first echelon and also as operational landing forces. The divisions which have been operating in the first echelon ind have lost their combatare removed from combat and are used to fill out the complement of the second echelon.
The airborne landing troops are represented on theas an airborne army consisting of three or four airborne divisions assigned toanding area for the operational landing forces of the front, and also for coordinated operations with the first operational echelon of the ground troops.
On the whole, according to the diagram of an operation, the compositionront consists of four army commands in all unitingootorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions'. As is known, during the last war approximatelyond more divisions were included in the compositionront. Considering that now the front's zone will be increased by two
or three times, the number of divisions of ground troops and airbo troopsodern operation will be reduced approximately by thre times.
As rough operational calculationsront needs jipproxiuclear (including aboutydrogen) warheads with an overall yieldilotons to accomplish its missions. Upissile launching mounts and aboutoelivery aircraft are needed-by the front in order to utilise these wa'rlreads.use of this quantity of nuclear/missile weapons, aboutoissile bases and depots ofoirfields,oivisions of ground troops, IS toaval bases, and other objectives can be destroyed.
The forces and weapons of the front will be echelonedepthtoilometers. epth of distribution of the forcesrontilometers, as was the case in the last war, does not answer the new conditions.
A front control echelon of the existing organization will no longer be able toront operation conducted according to the proposed scheme. The modern field control echelonront,eadquarters, must have commanders and staffs of the missile, ground, and airborne troops, antiaircraft defense, and aviation. This will correspond to the composition of the front and the particular features of troop operations in the operation.
A front operation, obviously, must be planned by stages. The first stage, for example, might include the neutralization and destruction of the enemy's main forces and weapons. The main content of it must be the repelling of the initial nuclear strike of the enemy and the delivery of the first nuclear/missile strike by forces of the front. The second stage can consist of completing the rout of the enemy's forces and weapons. Its content will be an offensive by ground froops, the execution of
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Legend to Diagram 1:
Reservesroup of amiesoercent of the forces).
Second defense zone and reserves of theoercent of the forces of the group of armies).
?lrstefense0ercent of the forces tbe group of armies).
-ifle divisions.
2nd echelon (reserve) of the army.
Tank division, tank corps, mechanized corps.
ifle divisions. 2nd echelon of the front.
ifle divisions.
2nd echelon (reserve) of the amy
ifle divisions.
Reserve of the amy rifle division.
BIfle division.
13* Mobile group of shemy (tank corps, mechanized corps).
1U, Second echelon (reserve) of thearmy rifle corps).
Depthrontm.
Depth of ar. armym.
Depth of the disposition of troops aad rear service elemen of them.
Diagramundamental Schemeront Offensive Operationodern 'War
Legervi to Diagram 2:
L. Airborne landingivisions.
Neutral countries.
1ivisions.
k. Medium-range missilescm).
Long-range missiles (rangem).
Echelon of airborne landing troops (airborne landingivisions).
7- Tank division.
Tank division.
Tank division.
2ivisions. Is; operalional echelon of ground troops.
2nd operational echelon of ground troops (defense army of tbe operational rearivisions.
of ec'nelor.Ing troops Depth of the frontn.
Original document.
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